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LABOR, THE STATE, AND AESTHETIC THEORY
IN THE WRITINGS OF SCHILLER
Philip J. Kain
University of California, Santa Cruz
This essay is concerned with Schiller, but it investigates themes that can
also be found in other writers, especially in Hegel and Marx. All of these
writers attempt (and ultimately fail) to work out a particular ideal model for
labor and political institutions. This model was patterned after the ideal cultural
conditions of ancient Greece and based upon modern aesthetic concepts, espe
cially the concept of a synthesis between sense and reason. It was a model
designed to overcome fragmentation or alienation in the modern world that had
been brought about by the development of the division of labor.
This model calls for the complete development of the individual's mental
and physical capacities. Even in labor, all of the individual's powers and
capacities should be harmoniously brought into play. The individual should not
be chained to a stunting sort of activity in which only isolated powers and
capacities are developed. Labor should be transformed into an enjoyable activ
ity. Even the difference between labor and leisure should be overcome.
Moreover, rational and sensuous capacities should be in harmony such that
principles and feeling, duty and inclination, are in agreement. Contrary to the
views of Kant, inclination should spontaneously accord with duty.
The individual should also be in unity with his object whether this object
be nature, the state, or the product of labor. He should not be dominated, but in
control. Thus, for example, the split between state and society should be
overcome. With the individual in control, with his faculties developed and in
harmony, he would have a free, contemplative relationship to his object an
aesthetic relationship.
Schiller sees the problems of the modern world clearly and tries to solve
them, but he fails. I will argue elsewhere that Hegel and Marx, following
Schiller, try much the same approach but ultimately give up the attempt and
change to a different model. Despite the fact that this original model never
succeeds, it plays an important part in and thus can illuminate the development
of late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought concerning labor and polit
ical institutions.
/
Schiller asserts that the condition of modern man is one of fragmentation,
a fragmentation that takes the general form of a separation and opposition
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between man's intellectual and sensuous capacities.1 It is the solution to this
problem that constitutes the most pressing and fundamental need of the modern
world. Schiller begins his search for a solution by turning to the culture of
ancient Greece. There fragmentation had not yet occurred. "At that first fair
awakening of the powers of the mind, sense and intellect did not as yet rule
over strictly separate domains; for no dissension had as yet provoked them into
hostile partition and mutual demarcation of their frontiers."2 The age had not yet
arrived where we find "whole classes of men, developing but one part of their
potentialities."3 The ancient world was still a world of unity; the citizen was still
at home with, in control of, his state. It had not yet become alien. The time had
not arrived where the "governed cannot but receive with indifference the laws
which are scarcely, if at all, directed to them as persons."4
What was it then that ended this ideal harmony? According to Schiller it
was the development of the division of labor. As culture required more spe
cialization, individual concrete life was sacrificed to the abstract life of the
whole. The individual was limited to one fragment of reality and whole classes
of men developed only a part of their
capacities.5 The most important results of
the division of labor were: enjoyment was separated from labor6; in his occupa
tion the individual no longer developed the harmony of his being, but merely
became the imprint of his occupation7; ranks and occupations were rigorously
separated8; and the state became alien (fremd) to its citizens.9 In general, man's
intellectual and sensuous capacities were separated and each began to develop
on its own.
Schiller does recognize certain improvements that this separation has
brought about.
I do not underrate the advantages which the human race today, considered as a
whole and weighed in the balance of intellect, can boast in the face of what is best
in the ancient world. But it has to take up the challenge in serried ranks, and let whole
measure itself against whole. What individual Modem could sally forth and engage,
man against man, with an individual Athenian for the prize of humanity?10
'A view similar to this can be also found in F. Holderlin, Hyperion, trans. W. R. Trask
(New York: Signet, 1965), p. 164; for the German see Samtliche Werke (Stuttgart: Cotta'sche
Buchhandlung, 1958), III, 160-61.
2F. Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education ofMan, trans. E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Wil-
loughby (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), p. 31; reference in all cases will also be made to
Schillers Werke (SW) (Weimar: H. Bohlaus, 1962), XX, 321.
3Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 37, and SW, XX, 324-25.
5Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322.
6Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 35, and SW, XX, 323.
Tbid.
'Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322-33.
'Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 37, and SW, XX, 324.
'"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322.
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An antagonism between faculties was the only manner in which a progress
in the development of man's capacities could have been brought about." This
was the only way for the species to progress, but the individual had to suffer. In
the long run, however, this antagonism brings a development to each faculty
that will eventually, Schiller hopes, again result in a unity and harmony but
now on a higher level.12 His goal is to maintain the advantages of progress and
division of labor, and at the same time to regain the unity, spontaneity, and
wholeness of the ancient world.13
//
In his consideration of art, Schiller contrasts the naive with the sentimental
artist. The naive artist, the artist of the ancient world, is in actual possession of
the ideal. In him and in his art we find a harmony between sense and reason.14
He is still in unity with
nature.15 In the sentimental artist, the artist of the modern
world, we no longer find unity except as an ideal to be realized. In the modern
world, man
can now express himself only as a moral unity, i.e., as striving after unity. The corre
spondence between his feeling and thought which in his first condition actually took
place, exists now only ideally; it is no longer within him, but outside of him, as an idea
to be realized, no longer as a fact in his life.16
Man either possesses nature as in the ancient world or seeks lost nature as in
the modern.17 However, the naive attains only a finite goal while the sentimental
strives for an infinite one. Thus the sentimental makes for progress, which
Schiller says is preferable.18
The goal for Schiller would be actual possession of the unity and harmony
of the naive together with the greatness of object and progress of the sentimen-
"Schiller here follows Kant's "Idea for s Universsl
History." On the influence of Ksnt's
philosophy of history on Schiller see J. Tsminisux, La Nostalgie de la Grece a I'aube de I'ideal-
isme allemand (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 25-32.
l:Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 41, and SW, XX, 326-27.
l3Wilkinson and Willoughby make this point in the introduction to their edition of the Aesth.
Ed., p. xiv.
'"F. Schiller, Naive and Sentimental Poetry and On the Sublime, trans. J. A. Elias (New York:
Ungar, 1966), p. in, and SW, XX, 436-37. Nietzsche's concept of the
"Apollinian" is patterned
after Schiller's "naive"; see F. Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York:
Vintage, 1967), pp. 43-45; for the German see Nietzsches Werke (Leipzig: Kroner, 1917), I,
32-33. But Nietzsche opposes the view that Greece can be summed up under just one category like
the naive; a tension slresdy exists between two principles the Apollinian and the Dionysian.
''Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 104, and SW, XX, 431.
'"Schiller, N & S Poet.; p. ill, and SW, XX, 437. The contrast between the ideal and the
actual in sentimental and naive art prefigures Hegel's categories of Romantic and Classical srt.
Further, for Schiller, much as for Hegel, the Greeks excelled in the plastic arts based on the
imagination while the moderns excel in the poetic arts that deal with ideals, spirit; see N & S Poet.,
p. 115, andSVV, XX, 440.
''Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 106, and SW, XX, 432.
'"Schiller, N &S Poet., p. 113, and SW, XX, 438.
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tal.19 This sort of synthesis would be the solution at the cultural level to the
problem of the modern world.
In On the Aesthetic Education ofMan, Schiller attempts to work out such
a synthesis. Aesthetic education will reconcile the developed but opposed facul
ties of the individual. After the breakdown of the ancient world there arose two
opposed drives. This opposition must be overcome. Material and formal im
pulses,20 sense and reason, must be aufgehoben into a third condition beauty.
If both impulses are in full operation at the same time, then the exclusiveness
of each will be cancelled. Schiller wants a reciprocal action between the
two drives such that the activity of each reinforces yet sets limits to the activity
of the other, and in which each achieves its highest manifestation precisely
through the action of the other.21 Here we have reciprocal subordination and
coordination.22 One of the clearest examples of this is given at the end of Letter
14. Schiller says that if we embrace with passion someone who deserves our
contempt, we feel pain at the compulsion of our nature. When we are ill disposed
toward someone who comands our respect, we feel pain over the compulsion of
our reason. But when someone has enlisted our affection and gained our respect,
all constraint disappears and we love that person.23 In the latter case each drive
aids the other. Far from interfering, each stimulates the other to its fullest
manifestation. Each becomes both an end and a means.
Here actual possession is not opposed to striving after the ideal; instead the
two are reconciled. As long as we confine ourselves to faculties or drives
within the individual, we can say that if both drives are in full operation
simultaneously then a synthesis occurs and the individual is in possession of
beauty aesthetic unity. Since neither drive is excluded, a balance is achieved
and made actual within the individual:
Each of these two primary drives, from the time it is developed, strives inevitably,
and according to its nature, towards satisfaction; but just because both are necessary,
and yet strive toward opposite ends, these two compulsions cancel each other out, and
the will maintains perfect freedom between them . That is to say, as soon as two
opposing fundamental drives are active within him, both lose their compulsion, and the
opposition of the two necessities gives rise to freedom.2"
In the Aesthetic Education this tension and opposition seem to be over
come. However, as soon as we consider Schiller's treatment of the sublime
(which he ignores for the most part in the Aesthetic Education2-), the tension
reappears.
"Schiller, N & S Poet., pp. 113, 175, and SW, XX, 439, 491.
20Schiller, Aesth. Ed., pp. 79-81, and SW, XX, 344-46.
2lSchiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 95, and SW, XX, 352.
22Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 8sn, and SW, XX, 347-48n.
23Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 97, and SW, XX, 354.
24Schiller, Aesth. Ed., pp. 135-37, and SW, XX, 371-73.
25R. D. Miller in his Schiller and the Ideal ofFreedom (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), p.
115, feels, he is not sure, that "energizing beauty" in the sixteenth and seventeenth Letters may be
a disguised form of the sublime. W. Bohm in his Schillers Briefe uber dsthetische Erziehung des
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In his essay, "On the
Sublime," Schiller compares the beautiful with the
sublime. Beauty implies the unity of sense and reason. The sublime is the
opposition, the contradiction, of sense and reason.26 It is the superiority of reason
over nature, reason's independence from the sensuous world, the assertion of
the individual's freedom in the face of external force. The sublime, Schiller
says, must disappear before the ideal of beauty.27 But on the other hand beauty
alone would never allow us to discover our higher destiny.28 Beauty is freedom
within nature; the sublime is freedom above nature. Beauty is valuable for the
human being; the sublime is valuable for the pure daemon in man.29 Beauty is
associated with childhood, our first and earliest development. But when we are
more mature we must apprehend the sublime by means of reason.30 In these
passages Schiller prefigures Hegel. The aesthetic is the human ideal, but the
rational is higher. But unlike Hegel, Schiller does try, if not to reconcile, at
least to make compatible both ideals for the modern world. He does not choose
the rational over the aesthetic as Hegel will. Man must be guided by both
ideals.31 Aesthetic unity leads to and aids the rational, and the rational takes
place within a condition of aesthetic unity. But this is not to reconcile the two.
It is to leave them as two ideals.32
Although the sublime is largely ignored in the Aesthetic Education, there
is one passage in which Schiller mentions it. He says that man must "learn to
desire nobly, so that he may not need to will
sublimely."'3
''Noble" is another
term that denotes the aesthetic condition. Thus Schiller appears to favor aes
thetic morality over the morality of the sublime even though in a footnote he
says that we rate the sublime "incomparably higher."34 This treatment of the
tension between the noble and the sublime, though very brief, is much like that
in the essay "On the
Sublime,"
except that in the Aesthetic Education Schiller
does not try to make the two compatible; rather he seems to choose the aes
thetic (or the noble) over the sublime.
Menschen (Halle/Salle: Niemeyer, 1927), pp. 1 15-17, 189, argues that energizing beauty is not the
sublime. Even if energizing beauty were relsted to the sublime, Schiller does not deal with it in
sufficient detail in the Aesthetic Education. To explore the tension between the beautiful and the
sublime, we must turn to the essay "On the
Sublime."
26Schiller, On Subl., p. 199. and SW, XXI, 43-
"Ibid. There exists a similar tension between grace and dignity. Grace requires a harmony
between the moral and physical natures. This is incompatible with dignity, which requires opposi
tion and struggle between the two. Grace has to do with acts in the sphere of human nsture, dignity
with a higher, nobler sphere; see F. Schiller, "On Grace and
Dignity," in Essays Aesthetical and
Philosophical in Schiller's Works (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1879), pp. 220-21, and SW, XX,
297-99.
28Schiller, On Subl., p. 199, and SW, XXI, 43-
"Schiller, On Subl., p. 210, and SW, XXI, 52.
"Schiller, On Subl., pp. 202-03, and SW, XXI, 46.
''Schiller, On Subl., pp. 210-11, and SW, XXI, 52-53.
"Even Wilkinson and Willoughby, strong proponents of the unity of the Aesthetic Education,
admit that the beautiful and the sublime are two different ideals; see Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. lix.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 169, and SW, XX, 388.
34Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. i67n, and SW, XX, 387^
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Only beauty is an aesthetic synthesis of sense and reason, and only by
pushing aside the sublime do we securely preserve the aesthetic condition. The
sublime is the very opposite a striving away from the sensuous or natural
toward a moral ideal. There is a wavering and a tension in Schiller's thought at
this level. As soon as the sublime is considered we find a tension between it
and beauty. Schiller seems undecided whether to try to make the two com
patible or to choose beauty over the sublime.
///
At the economic level Schiller's concern is with labor and classes. He
argues that the division of labor separates enjoyment from labor, separates
ranks and occupations, and makes the individual's occupation such that he does
not develop the harmony of his being in it.35 Reconciliation will never occur
in the modern world if man continues to be confined by this sort of fragmenting
activity.
An animal works, Schiller says, when the stimulus to its activity is need,
but it plays when the stimulus is sheer plenitude, the superabundance of life.36
Schiller's goal is to transform labor and to make it more like play.37
This ideal is seen most clearly in Schiller's discussion of recreation and
ennoblement. Recreation is understood as a transition from an intense state to a
state that is natural for man.38 It is a condition in which there would be "an
unlimited capacity for every human utterance ... the ability to experience all
our powers with equal freedom any separation and isolation of these
powers is an intense condition, and the ideal of recreation is the restoration of
our whole nature after one-sided tensions."39 The result is that "Beauty is the
product of accord between the mind and the senses; it addresses itself at once
to all the faculties of man and can, therefore, be perceived and appreciated only
under the condition that he employ all his powers fully and freely."*' It is im
portant to notice that the goal of recreation is not rest or cessation of activity.
The goal of ennoblement is the development of the moral individual, but
not abstractly. Ennoblement must involve activity.
These are the goals. But the existing conditions are different. "The state of
mind of most men is on the one hand intensive and exhausting labor, on the
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., pp. 33-35, and SW, XX, 321-22.
36Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 207, and SW, XX, 406.
"Schiller generally follows Kant's aesthetics, but not when considering labor. For Kant srt and
play are directly opposed to work; see I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New
York: Hafner, 1966), p. 146, snd for the German see Kant's gesammelte Schriften (KGS) (Berlin:
G. Reimer, 1913), V, 305. Kant also thinks the development of the division of labor in general
beneficial. He does not seem to appreciate its drawbacks; see I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of
the Metaphysic ofMorals, trans. T. K. Abbott (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949), p. 4, and KGS,
IV, 388.
38Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 169, and SW, XX, 486.
39Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 170, and SW, XX, 486.
""Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 171, and SW, XX, 487.
Labor, the State, and Aesthetic Theory in Schiller 269
other enervating
indulgence."41 Thus the man of action, the laborer, is in no
position to formulate the goal of recreation for he would make it too physical.42
He would formulate it to suit his own needs, i.e., rest, calm, cessation of
activity.43 Neither are the contemplative classes in a position to formulate the
goal of ennoblement. They would formulate it such that the man of action
would never be able to realize it in the course of daily life.44 Since men as they
exist are unfit to formulate these goals, men and their conditions must be
qualitatively changed. We need a
new class of men which, without toiling (arbeiten) are active (thdtig) and capable of
formulating ideals without fanaticism; a class that unites within itself all the realities of
life with its least possible limitations and is borne by the current of events without
becoming its victim. Only such a class can preserve the beautiful unity of human nature
that is destroyed for the moment by any particular task (Arbeit), and continuously by a
life of such toil (arbeitendes)
Arbeit is a negative term here. Work, toil, and exhausting labor are to be
overcome. The desirable condition is denoted by the term
"activity" (Tdtigkeit).
What does this mean? Is activity opposed to labor in the sense that it means the
exclusion or avoidance of labor, or is it to be understood as the ideal form of
labor, labor remade, qualitatively transformed into something enjoyable and
developing? Further, is the "new class of
men"
to be understood as a synthesis
of the other two classes that includes all men, or is it a small elite that merely
combines certain characteristics of the other two classes but excludes most
men? If all men are to be included in the new class, then in order to include the
laboring class, all labor will have to be transformed. On the other hand, if the
new class is only a small elite, then it will not be necessary that they labor;
labor will be dropped, left to the laboring class, and the new class will be
active in some other sense. Schiller's ideal, I shall argue, is to include all men
and to remake labor into activity. Nevertheless Schiller is unable to explain
how this can be accomplished and thus in fact ends up with a small
elite.46
The goal for both classes is to be active. The goal of the laboring class is
not to be rest or cessation of activity. Neither class can be permitted to formulate
the goal because the goal must fit both classes. The contemplative class espe
cially cannot be permitted to formulate the goal because the other class would
not be able to realize it in the tempestuous course of daily life.47 Labor must be
remade into activity.
"'Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 170, and SW, XX, 487-
"2Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 174, and SW, XX, 490.
"'Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 170, and SW, XX, 486-87.
""Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 174, and SW, XX, 490.
45Ibid.
"1 differ here from Lukacs who holds thst for Schiller it is not s regrettable fact but rather is
actually his very ideal that the "new
class"is an elite that avoids labor; see G. Lukscs, Goethe and
His Age, trans. R. Anchor (London: Merlin, 1968), pp. 134-35.
47Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 174, and SW, XX, 490.
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Labor in the ancient world was a satisfying and developing form of activ
ity, but after the development of the division of labor,
Enjoyment was divorced from labour, the means from the end, the effort from the
reward. Everlastingly chained to a little fragment of the whole, man develops into
nothing but a fragment; everlastingly in his ear the monotonous sound of the wheel that
he turns, he never develops the harmony of his being, and instead of putting the stamp
of humanity upon his nature, he becomes the imprint of his occupation or of his
specialized
knowledge.48
This is the fundamental problem of the modern world, the problem to be
overcome. But how is this to be done? Schiller says,
In general we call noble any nature which possesses the gift of transforming purely by
its manner of handling it, even the most trifling occupation, or the most petty objects
into something infinite. We call that form noble which impresses the stamp of autonomy
upon anything which by its nature merely serves some purpose (is a mere means). A
noble nature is not content to be itself free; it must set free everything around it, even
the lifeless.49
The emphasis here is on transformation, qualitative improvement, and not on
the exclusion or avoidance of the sorts of activities that are means. But how
successful is this explanation? The noble nature makes "everything around him
free"; he can transform
"anything." Would this include factory work? That
seems rather doubtful. At any rate Schiller would have to go into the problem
in much greater detail. Change in the quality of work stems completely from
the character of the individual due to his aesthetic education, his wholeness,
spontaneity, and unity. Nothing is said of change in the actual conditions of
work. If the only thing the individual has to rely upon is his own character he
could hardly expect to make the factory situation satisfying or enjoyable. Thus,
those who must work in the factory seem to be excluded. The ideal in which
"activity alone leads to enjoyment, and enjoyment alone to activity"50 seems
possible only for a few, and they will have to avoid labor.
Schiller does not really expect anything more for his "new class of
men."
He tells us that he offers this concept "only as an idea," which he "by no means
"'Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 35, and SW, XX, 323. There is a pssssge thst seems to exclude work
from the ideal: "they [the Greeks] transferred to Olympus what was meant to be realized on earth
they banished from the brow of the blessed Gods all the earnestness and effort (Arbeit) which
furrow the cheeks of mortals . . freed those ever contented beings from the bonds inseparable
from any purpose, every duty, every care, and made idleness snd indifferency the enviable portion
of divinity merely a more sublime name for the freest, most sublime state of being," Aesth. Ed.,
p. 109, and SW, XX, 359-60. But Schiller is not suggesting the exclusion of any activity or effort.
The condition of the gods is not achieved by excluding anything, but by including everything.
Their appearance is a synthesis of repose and activity. Thus if labor could be transformed into
activity for men, the condition of the gods could be realized on earth.
"'Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 16711, and SW, XX, 386n.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 191, and SW, XX, 398.
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wish[es] to have taken as a fact."51 This is to admit that the aesthetic ideal has
failed to become actual; it remains merely an ideal. Since it cannot actually be
possessed it is reduced to a goal to be striven after; it becomes, as Schiller
himself said, a moral ideal.52 Striving after me ideal and actual possession of it
have not been reconciled here as they seemed to be for a moment at the level of
individual faculties in the Aesthetic Education." Thus Schiller slips away from
an aesthetic to a moral or rational model. Only for a small elite is it to be the
case that there will be no contemplation divorced from activity, and no activity
separated from contemplation.
Freedom is achieved, Schiller argues, only when man is able to distance
himself from the world such that he is free to contemplate it. To distance
himself he must see to it that nature no longer dominates him. Man must make
nature his object; he must form it. He must be active upon matter. If he works
on it, gives it form, it can no longer rule him as a force.54 Thus man must be
active, but in such a way that at the same time he is free to contemplate his
object as well as his own activity. Here sense and reason (activity and contem
plation) would be in harmony.
The ideal would be to overcome the split between mental and physical
activity. If, besides, Schiller had been able to transform labor into activity, this
would have meant that he would be able to overcome the split between labor
and leisure. He objects to this split strongly:
True, we know that the outstanding individual will never let the limits of his occupation
dictate the limits of his activity. But a mediocre talent will consume in the office
assigned to him the whole of his meagre sum of powers, and a man has to have a mind
above the ordinary if, without detriment to his calling, he is still to have time for the
chosen pursuits of his leisure. Moreover, it is rarely a recommendation in the eyes of the
state if a man's powers exceed the tasks he is set, or if the higher needs of man
constitute a rival to the duties of his office.55
Notice that Schiller's objection to the rigid separation of labor and leisure is not
just in the interest of a small talented class but especially for the vast numbers
who are not so talented. But until labor is transformed into activity this split
will not be overcome.
What would be required to transform labor (Arbeit) into activity (Tatig-
keii)l As Schiller himself says it would require overcoming the division of
"Schiller, N & S Poet., p. 175, and SW, XX, 491. See also Aesth. Ed., p. 219, and SW,
XX, 412.
,;Schiller, N & S Poet., p. ill, snd SW, XX, 437.
53See sbove, section II.
5"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 185, snd SW, XX, 395.
35Aesth. Ed., p. 37, and SW, XX, 324. See also Aesth. Ed., p. 191, and SW, XX, 398, where
Schiller says, "The germ of beauty is as little likely to develop where nature in her niggardliness
deprives man of any quickening refreshment, as where in her bounty she relieves him of any
exertion."Both total lack of exertion (total leisure) and total lack of refreshment (total toil) sre
rejected.
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labor and its fragmenting effects. There are two important forms of the division
of labor. The first is a hierarchical division, a division according to classes or
castes, which usually includes a division between mental and physical activity.
Schiller failed to overcome this aspect of the division of labor when he failed to
reconcile the contemplative and the laboring classes. The second form of divi
sion of labor takes place within the work that any class or caste might perform.
There is a division of jobs, tasks, occupations, and functions. Schiller never
suggests doing away with these differences. His ideal seems to be much like
Marx's it is to leave the different functions as they stand but to see to it that
the individual is not "everlastingly chained to a single fragment of the whole,"56
i.e., to merely one function. One overcomes specialization by permitting the
individual to perform a variety of different functions. How could this be ac
complished? Schiller's only answer is that the individual must be given an
aesthetic education, that he learn to develop all of his powers and capacities
harmoniously something the individual is unable to do when his activity is
limited to one narrow occupation. The aesthetic condition, for Schiller, is the
ground of the possibility of all human functions and activities57; it leaves us
open, free to develop to the fullest all our powers and capacities, and it leaves
us equally disposed to all of them because they are all in harmony. It reconciles
thought and activity and frees us for both. Schiller thinks that this subjective
change on the part of the individual would be enough to overcome the frag
menting effects of specialization. But again this will only work for a few who
are not involved in labor.
IV
In the Aesthetic Education, Schiller's political goal is to overcome the
alien character of the modern state, to make it more like the ancient Greek state
before the development of the division of labor. In the ancient state, according
to Schiller, the spontaneous free participation of individuals determined the
form of the whole.58 In the modern world the state dominates and excludes the
individual.59 The goal is to overcome this split between the state and the individ
ual, or between state and society.60
To accomplish this, says Schiller, the individual must harmonize himself
with the ideal man. The ideal man is the species, the universal. This ideal is
represented by the state. In the state the diversity of individuals is represented
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 35, and SW, XX, 323.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., pp. 151-53. and SW, XX, 379-80.
58Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 35, and SW, XX, 323.
59Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 37, and SW, XX, 324.
^This also is the view of R. Leroux, "Schiller theoricien de l'etat," Revue Germanique, 28
(1938), 23. Leroux compares Schiller to Humboldt. Both argue for the greatest possible freedom
for the individual. But Humboldt maintains the duality between state and society, whereas for
Schiller the state is to be reabsorbed within society.
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as a
unity.61 In other words, in the modern state after the development of the
division of labor and specialization you cannot find universality, wholeness, the
harmonious sum of all powers and capacities, in any individual, but only
collectively in the aggregate of individuals, in the state. Schiller says that if we
compare the modern state as a whole to the Greek state, the modern rivals the
Greek. But if we compare the modern individual to the individual Greek, the
modern is a fragment.62
The problem again is with the individual, his lack of inner wholeness and
harmony, and the solution offered is again to remake the individual. Aesthetic
education, the development of all the powers and capacities of the individual,
the spontaneity and harmony of sense and reason, will bring about reconcilia
tion between man and state. The individual will become the state63 because the
individual will no longer be a fragment, restricted in his capacities and out
looks, incapable of dealing with the general, universal, and varied concerns of
the whole. Given this new individual, wholeness will no longer be found solely
at the level of the state; wholeness, the capacity of determining general and
universal concerns, will also belong to individuals. Given these developed
conditions it is Schiller's view that the state can now simply be the interpreter,
the representative, of the citizen. The state will only provide a clearer formula
tion of the
individuals'
sense of what is right.64 Duty and inclination, the general
and the particular interest, will be in harmony. Subjective man will be ennobled
to objectivity.65 Man will be honored as an end in himself.66 There will be agree
ment between the individual and the state because the state will be determined
by the individual. The state will reflect the individual.
It is also important to note that for Schiller the state cannot on its own
account bring about this harmony. Instead, inner harmony must be created in
men as individuals and this in turn will be reflected in the ideal state. No
reform will work in politics until the division in the inner man is healed. Sense
and reason, duty and inclination, must be reconciled through aesthetic educa
tion first.67
In Letter 27 of the Aesthetic Education, Schiller speaks of three types of
states. In the Natural or Dynamic state each man encounters others as a force.
Only in this way is activity restricted and order kept. Nature curbs nature. In
the Ethical or Rational state men have duties; men are opposed by rational laws
that fetter their will. The individual is subjected to the general will. In the
Aesthetic state men confront each other as objects of free play. The will of the
6lSchiller, Aesth. Ed., pp. 17-19, and SW, XX, 316.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 33, and SW, XX, 322.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 19, and SW, XX, 316.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 21, and SW, XX, 318.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 21, and SW, XX, 318.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 25, and SW, XX, 319.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 45. and SW, XX, 328.
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whole is carried out through the nature of the individual.68 In the Natural state
need drives man into society. In the Rational state reason implants social
principles in him. In the Aesthetic state, the ideal, beauty gives him a social
character.69
Perhaps the relationship among these three sorts of states can be explained
further in the following way. We might say that Kant had explained how
society passes historically from the Natural state to the Rational state and then
that Schiller explains how society can move beyond the Rational to the Aes
thetic state. Let us begin with Kant. In his "Idea for a Universal History" he
attempted to reconcile nature and reason. For Kant, we must assume that nature
as a whole is purposive, that reason is its goal. Society is developed through
natural antagonism (what Kant calls man's unsocial sociability). This natural
antagonism raises man from his slumber and causes him to develop all his
powers and capacities. Man is propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and
avarice, but in time he can come to be determined by reason. Conflict itself
leads men to what reason would have commanded from the beginning. A
society of men driven together by natural need will eventually be changed into
a moral whole, into a society based on practical
principles.70 Society moves
toward this end, toward a society of the greatest freedom, the greatest morality,
the fullest development of all powers and capacities. How can society reach
this end for Kant? He says that man must produce for himself anything that
goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence. Man creates for
himself his own perfection through his own reason.71 Kant argues that we must
assume a purposiveness in the whole of nature, i.e., that its goal is reason. We
must view history as if it were purposive. And with this assumption our intel
ligent activity can hasten the end.72
Thus as Schiller would express it, in the course of history social principles
(reason) will replace natural impulse (need) as the basis of society. But Schil
ler's view of the goal of history goes a step beyond Kant's. Rational social
principles are not enough. History for Schiller must move on to social charac
ter, the Aesthetic state.73 Inclination and duty, feeling and the moral law, nature
and reason, must be in harmony. Social character means that the whole man,
not just his rational part, has been reconciled with the general concerns of the
""Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 215, and SW, XX, 410.
""Ibid.
70I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History" in On History, ed. L. W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1963), pp. 15, 18, and KGS, VIII, 20-21, 24.
"Kant, "Univ. Hist.,' pp. 13-14, and KGS, VIII, 19-20.
72Kant, "Univ. Hist.," p. 22, and KGS, VIII, 27.
"Schiller's connecting of Kant's notion of the development of human powers through antago
nism (and the ultimate rational direction of this development) with an aesthetic condition like that
of ancient Greece as the goal of this development is already prefigured by J. G. Herder, Reflections
on the History ofMankind, trans. F. E. Manuel (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 82-87,
96-99; for the German see Sdmtliche Werke (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), XIV, 207-14, 225-28.
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whole. Man's relation to man must not be coerced by either nature or law. In
the Aesthetic state the individual is coerced neither by other men nor by the
state. There is no longer an opposition between duty and inclination, between
man and the state.
On the other hand, in an earlier essay, "On Grace and Dignity," Schiller
presents a political model that is different from the one we have just consid
ered. In this essay the ideal state is a monarchy where all goes according to the
(rational) will of one man, but where each citizen could persuade himself that
he governs and obeys his own inclination.74 Here there is indeed harmony and
agreement between sense (inclination of the citizens) and reason (the state), but
not of the same sort as in the Aesthetic Education. In the Aesthetic Education
the state merely reflects, is merely the interpreter of the individual's will; the
individual is the source of the determination. In "On Grace and Dignity" the
state is the source of the determination; sense and reason are not equals. Sense
has been brought to agree with reason, but nevertheless it is still subordinate to
reason. There is no true synthesis here. This can still be called a Rational state.
Even though sense is not forcefully suppressed by reason, nevertheless reason
is primary. Schiller here is still much closer to the Kantian morality than in the
Aesthetic Education. Here the difference between man and state, state and
society has not been overcome. Which then is the goal? We can safely say that
Schiller's mature thought is to be found in the Aesthetic Education where the
goal is the Aesthetic state. However, we might still ask what it is that will
move us on from the Rational to the Aesthetic state. Schiller's only answer is
the aesthetic education of the individual. It is true that such individuals would
bring about the possibility of an agreement between the individual and the
state, but what would further cause the state to allow itself to be actually
determined by the individual? Aesthetic education would at best bring about the
Rational state of "On Grace and Dignity"; some further change would be
necessary to bring about the Aesthetic state. Schiller does not deal with this.
His only solution is merely to change the subjective character of the individual;
he does not speak of how to change the objective character of the state except
to say that with these new individuals the change will follow through historical
development. But further, Schiller is even pessimistic about changing the char
acter of the individual. Where is the Aesthetic state to be found? Schiller's
answer is that it is to be found only in a few chosen circles, in the hearts of a
few rare individuals:
But does a State of such Aesthetic Semblance really exist? And if so, where is it to
be found? As a need, it exists in every finely tuned soul; as a realized fact, we are likely




pp. 200-01, and SW, XX, 278-79.
"Schiller, Aesth. Ed., p. 219, and SW, XX, 412.
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Thus the Aesthetic state becomes merely an ideal to be striven after, a moral
ideal, as Schiller himself put it. We will have to wait till the end of history. It
is a wish, an impossibility in the modern world. This is a moral or rational
model. If the Aesthetic state cannot be made actual then there is no alternative
but to slip back to the Rational state.
Some critics maintain that this sort of tension between two models reap
pears at all levels of Schiller's thought. Hans Lutz argues that Schiller through
out his writings has two ideals one aesthetic, the other moral (or rational)
which he continually wavers between and confuses. The moral or rational
model (influenced by the Kantian opposition of sense and reason), Lutz charac
terizes as a three-stage view, a progression through three stages: Nature
Taste Reason. The aesthetic model, Lutz characterizes as a synthesis model:
Nature Reason Synthesis (Beauty).76
The clearest example of the three-stage view can be found in Schiller's
essay "On the Moral Utility of Aesthetic
Manners,"
where Schiller is still quite
close to the Kantian morality. Normally, Schiller says, morality appears greater,
or at least more in relief, when in the face of powerful instincts to the contrary
the individual obeys reason. In such a case it is clear that the individual does
the act because it is moral, not because it is agreeable.77 This involves conflict
between sense and reason, inclination and duty. The rational and the sensuous
man are at odds. Thus, says Schiller, whatever could moderate this opposition
would help morality.78 And it is precisely beauty or taste that can moderate
inclination and bring it into accord with reason. The feelings place themselves
on the same side as the moral law.79 The individual has an inclination to duty.
But taste can never suffice to make an action moral. Morality can never have
any other foundation than its
own.80 Taste is only a means of removing obstacles
to the commands of reason. Reason is the goal or end here just as it was for
Kant. This is Nature Taste Reason.
In Schiller's essay "On Grace and
Dignity"
we can find an example of the
aesthetic model. Here the goal is to go even further in overcoming the harsh
ness of the Kantian morality. Here the noble soul can with a certain security
abandon itself to inclination.81 In other words taste can to a certain extent make
an action moral. Sense and reason are in harmony here in the sense that they
are equals. The entire character is moral. Here beauty is not merely a means to
make nature conform to reason. Nature and reason are equals and thus the
76H. Lutz, Schillers Anschauungen von Kultur und Natur (Germanische Studien, Vol. 60
[Berlin: 1928]), pp. 170-72, 187, 197, 205.
"Schiller, "The Moral Utility of Aesthetic Manners," in EssaysAesthetical and Philosophical,
pp. 126-27, and SW, XXI, 28-29.
78Schiller, "Mor. Util.," p. 129, snd SW, XXI, 30.
"Schiller, "Mor. Util.," p. 132, snd SW, XXI, 34.
80Schiller, "Mor. Util.," p. 126, and SW, XXI, 28.
"'Schiller, "Grace and Dignity," p. 209, and SW, XX, 287. On the development of Schiller's
ethical views see Leroux, "Schiller theoricien," pp. 5-6.
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synthesis of the two, beauty, is the end. Reason is no longer primary and nature
secondary.
But the synthesis model is not maintained throughout the essay "On Grace
and
Dignity." The monarchical political model just discussed is much closer to
Nature Taste Reason than it is to the synthesis model, whereas the political
model in the Aesthetic Education is clearly the synthesis model. It demanded
equality between inclination (of the citizens) and reason (the state). The first
did not play a subordinate role, and the synthesis of the two was higher than
either, thus overcoming the opposition between state and society.
The conflict between Lutz's two models will also illuminate the tension
noticed earlier between the beautiful and the sublime (although Lutz himself
does not discuss the sublime in much detail). In the sublime reason predomi
nates over sense. In the beautiful there is a synthesis of sense and reason. The
sublime and the beautiful are opposed. Schiller at one point attempts to make
these two ideals compatible and at another point chooses the latter over the
former.82
Lutz argues that even in the Aesthetic Education traces of the rational or
three-stage view persist. In Letter 3 he points out that the model is Natural
state third character (or Beauty) Rational state. This is very different from
the final conclusion in Letter 27 of Natural state Rational state Aesthetic
state. Indeed while Letter 3 is by far the clearest example of the three-stage
model, Lutz claims to see it running throughout the Aesthetic Education. His
view is that there are two strata in the Aesthetic Education: Nature Taste
Reason is found in Letters 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 16; and Nature Reason
Synthesis is found in Letters 4, 6, 7, 9, n-15, 17-27. 83
But while we can find traces of the three-stage view in the Aesthetic
Education, the tension that appears there cannot be explained simply as a
wavering or confusion between Lutz's two
models.84 The tension in Schiller's
mature thought occurs when he considers the possibility of realizing his ideal
political institutions, and as we have seen when he considers the issue of labor
and classes, and of the beautiful and the sublime. The last two of these issues
are for the most part avoided in the Aesthetic Education itself. At the level of
the individual (leaving out any consideration of the sublime) the synthesis, as
we argued, appears rather successful in the Aesthetic Education Lutz's thesis
of a wavering between two models illuminates Schiller's early development and
82See above, section II.
83Lutz, Schillers Anschauungen, pp. 22iff.
8"Wilkinson and Willoughby argue strongly for the unity of the Aesthetic Education. Conse
quently they see Lutz as one of their main opponents. They accuse Lutz of committing the genetic
fallacy, i.e., of using Schiller's earlier writings as a reliable guide to explaining the Aesthetic
Education; Aesth. Ed., pp. xliii-iv. However, they do not discuss whether Lutz's view of a tension
between two models is correct with respect to Schiller's writings other than the Aesthetic Education
and especially with respect to his earlier writings. It seems to me that here Lutz is correct.
85See above, section II.
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the tension between the beautiful and the sublime (which develops in the essay
"On the
Sublime" itself and in the contrast between this essay and the Aesthetic
Education). But at the economic and political level what we finally have is not
a wavering or confusion but an actual failure to achieve the clearly desired
aesthetic model. Schiller's failure to achieve a synthesis is due, first, to the fact
that he limits his goal to transforming only the individual and not the objective
conditions of labor and political institutions, and second, to his pessimism and
inability to explain how to transform more than a few individuals.
Schiller, we might say, sees the problem clearly and sets it up nicely. His
solution, however, cannot solve the difficult issues and so turns into a hope for
the future. Thus we no longer have a solution but only an ideal to strive after.
But this is what characterizes the moral, the rational, the sentimental. It is not
an aesthetic synthesis, as Schiller said himself.
